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The Roadmap for a Prospective US-ASEAN
FTA: Legal and Geopolitical Considerations
Pasha L. HSIEH*
This article examines the legal framework governing economic relations between the United
States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and outlines a roadmap for a
US-ASEAN FreeTrade Agreement (FTA). Notwithstanding ASEAN’s emerging centrality in
Asian regionalism,America remains the only Pacific power that has not concluded any form of
FTA with ASEAN.This article explains that limited progress inWashington’s efforts stemmed
from the domestic politics of the US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA)
approach and the Myanmar dilemma. It further analyses the challenges that the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) Agreement negotiations have encountered and contends that the TPP cannot
be a substitute for a US-ASEAN FTA. Finally, a ‘Plan B’ roadmap to reinvigorate
US-ASEAN trade ties is proposed.This roadmap calls for an enhanced TIFA that incorporates
the building block features of ASEAN’s framework agreements, thereby laying a solid yet
gradual foundation for an FTA. This research therefore provides a valuable study of a
region-based FTA under the multilateral trading system.
1 INTRODUCTION
Asia’s rise is demonstrated by its rapidly increasing share of global trade and is
reinforced by the fact that for the first time, it over took the European Union
(EU) as the largest US export destination.1 Asia’s economic and security
significance has shaped American foreign policy with the new goal of re-engaging
in the region. Despite political rhetoric, the United States lacks a comprehensive
roadmap for its trade policy in Asia.
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the National Taiwan University College of Law for their insights or comments on earlier drafts of
this article. All errors are his own.
1 Aaron Siirila, ‘U.S. Exports to Asia Surpass Those to Europe for First Time Ever’, <http://asean
mattersforamerica.org/u-s-exports-to-asia-surpass-those-to-eu/268>, 17 May 2010.
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The two locomotives for emerging Asian regionalism are China and the
ten-country bloc, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).2 The
‘Asia’ policy of both the US executive branch and Congress is overshadowed by
intensifying trade conflicts with China, including trade remedies, intellectual
property protection, and Renminbi re-evaluation. US policymakers have perceived
ASEAN as a functional rather than indispensible partner in the Asia Pacific.3
ASEAN’s relevance is merely revealed in the backdrop of Washington’s war on
terror or its countermeasures against China’s rise. Since 2002, ASEAN as a single
entity has concluded free trade agreements (FTAs) with China, Japan, South
Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand.4 America remains the only major
country in the region that has not signed any form of FTA with ASEAN. If the
United States wishes to remain a Pacific power and salvage its economy devastated
by the financial crisis and credit rating downgrade, it is essential that Washington
adopts a pragmatic solution to cement its hub-and-spoke alliance system in Asia.
This article argues that the legal frameworks governing US-ASEAN trade ties
should be reinvigorated. To this end, it examines the roadmap for concluding a
region-based FTA from legal and geopolitical perspectives. Section 2 explores
current bilateral economic relations and provides compelling reasons for a
US-ASEAN FTA.The section also analyses economic and political obstacles that
contribute to the failure of the US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
(TIFA) approach and US economic sanctions against Myanmar (Burma). Section 3
discusses ASEAN’s emerging centrality in Asian regionalism due to its internal
integration and external FTAs with regional economies. It then explains the
potential impasse of the current US-backed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
Agreement and contends that the TPP cannot serve as a substitute for a
US-ASEAN FTA.Against this background, this article proposes a ‘Plan B’ roadmap
based on an ‘enhancedTIFA’ that incorporates building block features of ASEAN’s
framework agreements. Section 4 concludes by summarizing legal and policy
recommendations for trade negotiators from both ASEAN and the United States.
2 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Myanmar (Burma), Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.
3 See, e.g., Alice Ba, ‘Systemic Neglect? A Reconsideration of US-Southeast Asia Policy’, Contemp.
S.E. Asia 31, no. 3: 369, 370–371 (‘ . . . US involvement in Southeast Asia suffers from “neglect”
(benign or otherwise), “episodic attention”, . . . and subject to “strategic drift.”’).
4 See generally ‘ASEAN FTA Agreements’, <www.aseansec.org/Fact%20Sheet/AEC/AEC-12.pdf>,
1 Jul. 2011.
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2 AN EXAMINATION OF US-ASEANTRADE RELATIONS
Notwithstanding ASEAN Member States’ differences in size, population, and gross
domestic product (GDP),5 the bloc has evolved as a regional economic power.
With its GDP growing more than 170% over the past decade,ASEAN is now the
third largest Asian economy, behind only China and Japan.6 ASEAN is also a
major trade partner of the United States.Yet, from ASEAN’s view,Washington’s
focus on Southeast Asia has been ‘episodic rather than consistent’ and subject to
US-centric security considerations.7 The fact that US trade policy on ASEAN fails
to yield substantial results will eventually erode America’s geostrategic goals.
2.1 REASONS FOR CONCLUDING A REGION-BASED FTA
There are salient economic and geopolitical reasons for signing a prospective
US-ASEAN FTA. First, US economic interests in Southeast Asia are significant.
The United States and ASEAN are currently each other’s major trading partner.
Bilateral trade totalling USD 149.6 billion makes America ASEAN’s fourth largest
trading partner, after China, the EU, and Japan.8 ASEAN collectively is America’s
fourth largest export destination.9 Regarding individual ASEAN countries, US
exports are primarily bound to Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand.10 Moreover, US
foreign direct investments (FDIs) in ASEAN, which amount to more than USD
153 billion, have been even greater than America’s combined total investment in
China, Japan, and Korea.11 Such substantial trade relations make ASEAN an ideal
FTA partner in emerging Asia. US policymakers should be cautioned that in 2008,
China’s imports from and exports to ASEAN exceeded those of America by 6%
5 See ‘Table 1: Selected Basic ASEAN Indicators’, <www.aseansec.org/stat/Table1.pdf>, 15 Feb. 2011.
6 ‘ASEAN’s Importance’, <http://aseanmattersforamerica.org/aseans-importance>, 1 Jul. 2011.
7 Tommy Koh, ‘The United States and Southeast Asia’, in America’s Role in Asia, Asian and American
Views: Recommendations for U.S. Policy from Both Sides of the Pacific (2008), 35, 37.
8 ‘Table 19: ASEAN Trade by Selected Partner Country/Region, 2009’, <www.aseansec.org/stat
/Table19.pdf>, 15 Jul. 2010.
9 ‘Remarks by Ambassador David Carden at the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council ASEAN Dinner,
Washington, DC’, <http://asean.usmission.gov/news06032011.html>, 3 Jun. 2011; Thomas Lum et
al., ‘United States Relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), CRS Report
for Congress’ (16 Nov. 2009), 16.
10 Table AI.4:Merchandise Exports and Re-exports byTrading Partner, 2003–2009,Trade Policy Review
Report by the Secretariat: United States Revision,WT/TPR/S/235/Rev/1 (20 Oct. 2010), 132.
11 Remarks by Deputy Chief of Mission, Louis Mazel, Embassy of the United States, Workshop on
US-ASEAN Relations, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 16 Jul. 2010 (on file with the
author); for US foreign direct investment (FDI) in ASEAN, see Table 4: FDI Flows to ASEAN from
the EU, Japan, the United States, and China: 2006–2008; Mark E. Manyin et al., ‘U.S.Accession to the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), CRS Report for
Congress’ (26 Oct. 2009), 6.
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and 75%, respectively.12 Due to the lack of effective US engagement, China has
surpassed the United States in economic significance to ASEAN.
Second, a US-ASEAN FTA will increase each side’s exports by furthering
liberalization of trade barriers. This is particularly important, given the Doha
Round impasse. From US businesses’ perspective, major obstacles to expand trade
in ASEAN do not concern tariff.13 Instead, critical difficulties result primarily in
non-tariff barriers (NTBs), such as quantitative restrictions, import licensing, and
trading rights.14 Service and investment barriers also prevent US enterprises from
penetrating ASEAN’s telecommunications, banking, securities, and other financial
markets.15 As of now, the World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes that were
initiated by the United States against ASEAN countries mostly arose from barriers
to automobile, port, and poultry industries.16 The fact that the ten ASEAN
countries, except for Singapore, are not parties to the WTO Agreement on
Government Procurement (GPA) also impairs US business opportunities.17
Moreover, ASEAN’s endemic problem concerning intellectual property right
(IPR) protection is also evidenced by the 2011 Special 301 review process, which
places Indonesia and Thailand on the Priority Watch List, and Malaysia, the
Philippines, andVietnam on theWatch List.18
From ASEAN’s perspective, the most serious obstacle to the American market
is US trade remedies, particularly anti-dumping actions, against ASEAN exports.
Remarkably, four of the seven WTO complaints that ASEAN countries filed
against the United States challenged its measures under the WTO Anti-Dumping
Agreement.19 According to ASEAN complaints during the 2010 US Trade Policy
Review, US agricultural subsidies under its Farm Bill also seriously undermine
ASEAN’s farm exports to the US market.20 In addition, US regulations on trade
12 Manyin et al., supra n. 11, at 5, n. 5.
13 See Dean A. DeRosa, ‘US Free Trade Agreements with ASEAN’, in Free Trade Agreements: US
Strategies and Priorities, ed. Jeffrey J. Schott (2004), 117, 130 (‘[In 2000,] ASEAN average tariff levels
are . . . in the moderate range of 8 to 12 percent; the exceptions are [duty-free] Singapore, . . . and
Thailand, whose average applied tariff stands just over 18 percent.’). See also Table 6.6: Trade and
Protection in the United States and ASEAN Countries, Circa 2000.Ibid., 131–35.
14 See ‘Sections of Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
and Vietnam, 2010 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers’, <www.ustr.gov
/sites/default/files/uploads/reports/2010/NTE/NTE_COMPLETE_WITH_APPENDnonameack.pdf>.
15 See ibid.
16 These disputes (DS59, 74, 102, 195, and 403) are US complaints against Philippines and Indonesia.
For details, see Annex II.
17 Singapore acceded to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) in 1997. ‘Parties
and Observers to the GPA’, <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm>, 20 Jul.
2011.
18 ‘Executive Summary, 2011 Special 301 Report’, <www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2844>.
19 These cases (DS324, 343, 383, and 401) are initiated by Thailand and Vietnam. For details, see
Annex II.
20 Jemy Gatdula, ‘Trade Tripper: The Flaky Ally’, Business World, 7 Oct. 2010, <www.bworldonline
.com/main/content.php?id=19107>.
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in services pose restrictions for both ASEAN professionals and low-skilled labour
to enter the US market.21 These trade barriers in ASEAN and the United States
demonstrate substantial room for improving bilateral trade and should be
effectively addressed in a US-ASEAN FTA.
Third, a US-ASEAN FTA will facilitate ASEAN integration, which is
mutually beneficial to both sides. FTA negotiations and implementation invariably
prompt ASEAN countries to find a common stance and expedite harmonization
of customs procedures and national standards. These integration efforts will
increase ASEAN’s competitiveness by attracting American and other sources of
FDIs and, more importantly, accelerate ASEAN’s goal to form the ASEAN
Economic Community (AEC) as a single market by 2015.22 The AEC will allow
US corporations to place their production chains in ASEAN based on each
country’s comparative advantage, thereby substantially reducing operation costs.
ASEAN’s unity will also facilitate Washington’s FTA comprehensive strategy in
Asia, providing foundation for negotiating the enlargedTPP and, in the long run, a
Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) that includes twenty-one Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies.23
Finally, given Southeast Asia’s increasingly regional significance, a US-ASEAN
FTA will strengthen the US security alliance that is essential to the US role in
Asia. In past decades, ASEAN has evolved as an indispensable geopolitical hub. It
has not only hosted the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since 1994 but also the
East Asia Summit (EAS) since 2005.24 Both the ARF and the EAS include key
stakeholders in the region and cover topics that concern America’s core interests
ranging from North Korea missiles tests to anti-terrorism efforts. The United
States is an original member of the ARF and signed the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) to be a formal dialogue partner in the EAS
in 2009.25
Among ASEAN countries, the Philippines and Thailand are treaty allies and
were further designated by the Bush Administration as ‘major non-NATO allies’,
thus entitling them to US military aid under the US Foreign Assistance Act of
21 See DeRosa, supra n. 13, at 139 (‘Most importantly, especially for low-income ASEAN countries, US
immigration laws . . . prohibit general immigration of unskilled labor to the United States to meet
the high demand for the services of low-wage labor.’).
22 ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard (2010), 3.
23 The US policy is to use the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement as a building block for the
Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). Ian F. Fergusson & Bruce Vaughn, ‘The Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement, CRS Report for Congress’ (10 Jan. 2011), 2.
24 Lum et al., supra n. 9, at 5.
25 See Manyin et al., supra n. 11, at 1 (‘On July 22, 2009, in Phuket,Thailand, Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clinton . . . signed the Instrument of Extension and the Instrument of Accession to
ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC).’).
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1961.26 Singapore and the two large Muslim countries, Indonesia and Malaysia, are
also US security partners. Specifically, ASEAN countries’ territorial disputes with
China concerning the Spratly Islands and US insistence on freedom of navigation
in the South China Sea make US-ASEAN security cooperation mutually
critical.27 A US-ASEAN FTA will fortify such cooperation. Dominated by
geostrategic considerations, current US FTAs in force cover only two countries of
the nation’s top ten trade partners.28 US trade in goods with respective FTA
partners – Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, and Oman – constitutes a mere 0.1%
of total US trade.29 It is thus vital forWashington to engage in an effective strategy
with ASEAN involving overarching trade and security stakes.
2.2. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND GEOPOLITICAL OBSTACLES
Despite significant benefits for both the United States and ASEAN to conclude a
region-based FTA, such a development has progressed marginally. The legal
frameworks that govern US-ASEAN trade ties are poorly structured and thus
provide limited support for the private sector. The absence of meaningful legal
frameworks is due to US perception of ASEAN. Following the September 11
attacks, the Bush Administration predominantly focused its foreign policy on the
Middle East and viewed Southeast Asia through the lens of the war on terror.
ASEAN leaders’ view that Bush lacked strong commitment to the region eroded
the effectiveness of US initiatives to deepen bilateral ties.30
President Barack Obama, who came into office in 2009, seemingly adopted a
different policy to re-engage Asia with a focus on ASEAN.31 As the country’s ‘first
26 Thomas Lum, ‘The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests, CRS Report for Congress’ (3 Jan.
2011), 11; Emma Chanlett-Avery, ‘Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report for
Congress’ (2 Oct. 2006), 9 and n. 25.
27 US Sectary of State Hillary Clinton claimed that ‘[t]he United States has a national interest in freedom
of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in the South
China Sea’. Mark Landler, ‘Offering to Aid Talks, U.S. Challenges China on Disputed Islands’, New
York Times, 23 Jul. 2010, <www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24diplo.html>. For South
China Sea issues and US-China relations, see Zha Daojiong, ‘South China Sea Diplomacy: More
Needs to be Done’, PacNet, no. 35, 19 Jul. 2011, <http://csis.org/files/publication/pac1135.pdf>.
28 US Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that are currently in force cover seventeen countries, and Canada
and Mexico rank as the first and third largest trade partners, respectively. ‘Free Trade Agreements,
USTR’, <www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements>, 1 Aug. 2011; US Census Bureau,
‘Top Trading Partners – Total Trade, Exports, Imports: Year-to-Date December 2010’,
<www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1012yr.html>, 1 Aug. 2011.
29 Table AII.2: Overview of U.S. Free-Trade Agreements, March 2010,Trade Policy Review Report by
the Secretariat: United States Revision,WT/TPR/S/235/Rev/1 (20 Oct. 2010), 139–141.
30 These initiatives ‘included becoming the first country to appoint an ambassador to ASEAN, providing
assistance to the ASEAN Secretariat to upgrade its capabilities, and launching the US-ASEAN Trade
and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA)’. Lum et al., supra n. 9, at 2.
31 See Patrick deGategno, ‘America’s Renewed Engagement of Asia’, <www.acus.org/new_atlanticist
/americas-renewed-engagement-asia>, 12 Nov. 2010 (‘Obama’s renewed engagement of Asia is an
JOURNAL OFWORLDTRADE372
Pacific President’, Obama was the first US president who met ASEAN heads of
states, although the meeting was held on the sidelines of the 2009 APEC Summit
in Singapore.32 At the invitation of Obama, the Second US-ASEAN Leaders
Meeting also took place in NewYork in 2010.33 Nonetheless, the political gestures
and the consistent emphasis on deepening economic ties have thus far failed to
enhance legal frameworks governing bilateral trade.34 The need forWashington to
articulate a more comprehensive trade strategy on ASEAN negotiations has caused
concerns for the US Congress. For instance, Republican Senator Richard Lugar
introduced Senate resolutions to direct the United States Representative Office
(USTR) to engage ASEAN in serious FTA negotiations.35 These resolutions not
only signal that current frameworks cannot meet US interests in expanding
bilateral ties with ASEAN but also recognize that the TPP is unable to substitute a
US-ASEAN FTA.The impediments for the US executive branch to develop this
FTA are examined below.36
2.2[a] The BilateralTIFAApproach
The US-favoured approach to develop FTAs with individual ASEAN states under
a TIFA proved futile in the past decade.The ASEAN-US Initiative, developed in
the 1980s, was a formal study initiated by US and ASEAN governments to
enhance bilateral economic cooperation.37 The US-proposed Enterprise of
ASEAN Initiative (EAI) in 2002 was the first meaningful start to strengthen legal
frameworks on US-ASEAN trade ties.38 Compared to the Obama
Administration’s TPP efforts, the EAI can be categorized as an ‘old roadmap’ to
attempt to renovate America’s regional role [and] it is perhaps the first time that an American
president’s renewed diplomacy enshrined improving cooperation with regional organizations [such as
ASEAN] as a core priority.’).
32 ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall, Tokyo, Japan’, <www.whitehouse
.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-suntory-hall>, 14 Nov. 2009; Lum et al.,
supra n. 9, at 2.
33 ‘Joint Statement of the 2nd U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meeting, New York, NY’, <www
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/24/joint-statement-2nd-us-asean-leaders-meeting>, 24
Sep. 2010.Myanmar was only represented by its foreign minister at the meeting.
34 See ibid. (indicating that both the United States and ASEAN should ‘further economic cooperation’
and intensify trade under the ‘ASEAN-U.S.TIFA’).
35 See generally S. Res. 311 (111th Congress), 13 Oct. 2009; S. Res. 218 (112th Congress), 29 Jun.
2011.
36 Senator Lugar explained that ‘[w]hile there may be merit to the Trans-Pacific Partnership …, the
reluctance of the Obama Administration to signal its commitment to developing a strategy for
pursuing an FTA with ASEAN suggests to ASEAN leaders that they should first look to China,
India and elsewhere . . . .’ ‘Lugar Urges US-ASEAN FTA Negotiations’, The Nation, <www.nation
multimedia.com/2011/06/29/national/Lugar-urges-US-Asean-FTA-negotiations-30158978.html>, 2 Aug.
2011.
37 Mari Pangestu, ‘Southeast Asian Regional and International Economic Cooperation’, in
International Relations in Southeast Asia:The Struggle for Autonomy, ed. Donald E.Weatherbee (2005), 187,
212.
38 ‘Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative’, <www.amchamvietnam.com/876>, 2 Aug. 2011.
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intensify trade relations with ASEAN.The EAI’s goal was to form a network of
bilateral FTAs with ten ASEAN countries and to strengthen ASEAN economic
integration.39 Under the EAI, the two conditions for a prospective FTA are that
an ASEAN state must be aWTO member and must sign a TIFA with the United
States.40 A TIFA, which serves as a precursor to a full-fledged FTA, provides a
high-level consultative mechanism for the United States to strengthen economic
reform in a potential FTA partner.
The EAI roadmap did not enable the United States to achieve the intended
FTA goal as of 2011.The limited ‘success’ was the conclusion of the US-Singapore
FTA (USSFTA) in 2003 and TIFAs with seven other ASEAN countries without
evolving to FTAs.41 The relatively smooth negotiations of the USSFTA were due
to Singapore’s duty-free trade regime and the lack of an agricultural sector in the
island state. These unique features made Singapore distinguishable from other
ASEAN states in FTA negotiations.
US FTA negotiations with ASEAN countries were unsuccessful on various
grounds. For example,Washington’s insistence on a comprehensive, non-sectoral
agreement modelled on the USSFTA inevitably made Thailand-US FTA
negotiations complex.42 The US intention to include WTO-plus pharmaceutical
patent protection caused particular concerns to the Thai public health sector.43 In
2006, FTA talks became impossible due to Thailand’s political crisis involving a
military coup.44 Malaysia-US FTA negotiations also halted in 2008.45 The prime
hurdle was Malaysia’s government procurement policy under its New Economic
Program that favours ethnic Malays (known as Bumiputera) in the bidding process
and preferential treatment for companies owned by the group.46 The expiration of
39 See generally ‘Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative’, <www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/other-initiatives/asean-
initiative>, 2 Aug. 2011.
40 See also ‘Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative’, supra n. 38 (‘Under the EAI, the United States offered the
prospect of bilateral free trade agreements with ASEAN countries that are committed to economic
reforms and openness inherent in an FTA with the United States.’).
41 ‘President Signed US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement’, <http://singapore.usembassy.gov
/050603a.html>, 6 May 2003; the United States concluded TIFAs with Brunei, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. Annex 1.
42 See Raymond J. Ahearn & Wayne M. Morrison, ‘U.S.-Thailand Free Trade Agreements, CRS
Report for Congress’ (28 Jul. 2006), 6–11 (detailing issues in FTA negotiations).
43 See generally Duangrat Laohapakakul, ‘United States – Thailand Free Trade Agreement
Negotiations: Potential Effects on Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in Thailand, LL.M. Paper,
Harvard Law School’, <http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/774/Laohapakakul06.pdf>, April
2006.
44 See Ahearn & Morrison, supra n. 42 (‘In March 2006,Thailand suspended the negotiations pending
the outcome of the snap April general election (which was subsequently invalidated by a
constitutional court).’).
45 Michael F. Martin, ‘The Proposed U.S.-Malaysia Free Trade Agreement, CRS Report for
Congress’ (25 Jan. 2008), 29–30.
46 Ibid., 17 and 24.
JOURNAL OFWORLDTRADE374
the US president’s fast-track authority or trade promotion authority (TPA) in
2007 may have also prompted Malaysia to discontinue FTA efforts.47
The limited US FTA progress resulted from a US model FTA with
WTO-plus obligations, which developing ASEAN countries found difficult to
accept. In my view, acceptance of the US bilateral FTA approach would have
undermined ASEAN’s core benefits.There are foreseeable negative consequences
absent a US-ASEAN FTA or a valid promise to conclude a similar region-based
agreement. It is in Washington’s best interest to pursue bilateral FTAs only with
ASEAN countries that are important US export markets, that is, Singapore,
Malaysia, and Thailand. The potential bandwagoning effect would galvanize
subsequent FTA partners to make additional concessions pursuant to the
benchmark set under the first ‘high standard’ FTA, such as the USSFTA. ASEAN
would thus face fragmentation if more developed countries vie to conclude
separate FTAs with the United States.48 This disintegrated development would
deprive ASEAN of its combined leverage in negotiations withWashington and, in
the long term, weaken the bloc’s common stance in APEC, the Cairns Groups,
and theWTO.49
Individual US FTAs with some ASEAN countries would also isolate
unfavourable trade partners that are undemocratic and of limited trade interest to
the United States. This alienation would diminish ASEAN’s and America’s
collective political influence over countries, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar,
and Vietnam (known as CLMV countries). Economically, selective FTAs would
widen the gap between more developed ASEAN countries and the less developed
ones, thus counteracting ASEAN integration. Moreover, ASEAN’s weakening
coalition would decrease its status as a hub of regionalism, and China would, in
turn, take its place. China’s version of Asian regionalism, the East Asia Economic
Community (EAEC), attempts to exclude the United States and thus diminishes
47 Michael F. Martin, ‘The Proposed U.S.-Malaysia Free Trade Agreement, CRS Report for Congress’
(25 Jan. 2008), 31.
48 See Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, ‘ASEAN-US Relations: Challenges Ahead’, <www.siiaonline
.org/files/Prof.%20Anak%20Agung%20Banyu%20Perwita.pdf>, 2 Aug. 2011 (‘[T]he tendency of
the US government to deal bilaterally with individual ASEAN Member States rather than with
ASEAN collectively on [economic] issues do not help the US to win trust among ASEAN
people.’). Surin Pitsuwan, Secretary-General of ASEAN, stated that ‘[ASEAN] leaders need to
convince Americans to look at it as a single unit’. Men Kimseng, ‘ASEAN Leaders Seek US Trade
Attention’, Voice of America, 11 May 2010, <www.voanews.com/khmer-english/news/Asean-Leaders
-Seek-US-Trade-Attention-93425919.html>.
49 Mohd Haflah Piei, Director of the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research, commented that
‘[t]he co-existence of regional and bilateral FTAs may be viewed as a sign of ASEAN’s
disintegration and the situation may be exploited by its trading partners to their advantage in
negotiating . . . FTAs’. Arun Bhattacharjee, ‘Bilateral Deals Hinder ASEAN Trade Block’, Asia
Times, 30 May 2003, <www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/EE30Ae04.html>; see also Ludo
Cuyvers, ‘An EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Reflections on Issues, Priorities, Strategies’, CAS
Discussion Paper No. 53 (October 2007), 14 (‘[T]he EU approach to restrict an FTA to ASEAN
7 . . . can easily divide the ASEAN countries in negotiations.’).
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its regional stake. For these reasons, the old roadmap under the USTIFA approach
is at the cost of ASEAN’s development and should not be the blueprint for
prospective US-ASEAN trade ties.
2.2[b] The Myanmar Dilemma
The EAI’s goal to form a network of bilateral FTAs with individual ASEAN states
failed to progress satisfactorily. Washington also attempted to conclude an FTA
with ASEAN as a single entity in 2006 when the US-ASEAN TIFA was signed
under the US-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership framework.50 The US-ASEAN
TIFA could have paved a way towards developing a framework with ASEAN, but
no progress was made. The conspicuous obstacle to this region-based FTA has
been the political Myanmar dilemma.
Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN in 1997 was controversial.51 Unlike the EU,
ASEAN never made democracy a condition of membership. Given Myanmar’s
abundant resources and strategic location bordering China and India, it was of
ASEAN’s geopolitical interest to engage rather than isolate the regime.52
However, since 1997, the United States has imposed economic sanctions on
Myanmar as a response to the suppression of the democratic opposition by the
military junta, known as the State Peace and Development Council.53 US
sanctions against Myanmar made a US-ASEAN FTA essentially impossible
because of the US Congress’s robust resistance to include Myanmar in the FTA
and ASEAN states’ opposing insistence on negotiating the FTA only as a group.54
Divergent US and ASEAN approaches towards Myanmar have been the key
impediment to bilateral security and economic cooperation.55
50 Lum, supra n. 9, at 16.The ASEAN-US Initiative was a framework that the United States created with
goals of providing security and economic assistance to ASEAN.Ibid.
51 Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former
ASEAN Secretary-General (2006), 131–135.
52 Ibid., 134.
53 The United States imposes economic sanctions on Myanmar based on s. 570, Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, Tom
Lantos Block Burmese Jade Act of 2008, and Executive Orders 13047, 13310, 133448, and 13464.
Michael F. Martin, ‘Burma’s 2010 Elections: Implications of the New Constitution and Election
Laws, CRS Report for Congress’ (29 Apr. 2010), 14 and n. 43.
54 See Severino, supra n. 51, at 329 (‘ASEAN Economic Ministers . . . insisted that the EAI be discussed
with ASEAN as a whole and that a framework be worked out between ASEAN as a group and the
United States.’).
55 See Larry A. Niksch, ‘Burma-U.S. Relations, CRS Report for Congress’ (2 Jun. 2008), 9
(‘ASEAN leaders stressed to the Bush Administration that ASEAN assertiveness has limits and will
not include economic sanctions against Burma.’).
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The US policy remained unchanged until the Obama Administration adopted
a new ‘pragmatic engagement’ policy in 2009.56 Ostensibly,Washington no longer
seeks ‘regime change’ but encourages high-level talks with Myanmar’s leadership
while continuing US economic sanctions.57 This policy change promoted senior
officers’ dialogue with the government of Myanmar before and after the heavily
criticized 2010 election, which barred the participation of the National League for
Democracy led by Aung San Suu Kyi.58
Washington’s ‘old wine in a new bottle’ approach has neither brought major
changes to Myanmar’s political reform nor reinvigorated US-ASEAN FTA
negotiations. The US policy simply missed the point. Maintaining current
sanctions against Myanmar will further erode America’s already-dwindling
regional influence and alienate the United States from ASEAN. The following
evidence illustrates the inefficacy of the decade-long sanctions. Despite
often-mislabelled ‘international’ economic sanctions on Myanmar, trade with the
country is only blocked by the West, which includes the United States, the EU,
and Canada.59 In fact, Myanmar has never been severely affected by the sanctions
because it engages most trade with ASEAN countries and China. The list of
Myanmar’s top ten trade partners reveals the blind spot in the US policy.60 These
countries include five ASEAN countries (Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia,
and Vietnam), two US FTA partners (Singapore and Korea), and two TPP
participants (Malaysia and Vietnam).61 Not to mention the fact that current
sanctions do not apply to US-based Chevron and French-based Total, both of
56 David I. Steinberg, ‘Aung San Suu Kyi and U.S. Policy toward Burma/Myanmar’, J. Current S.E.Asian
Aff. 29, no. 3 (2010): 35, 42.
57 Ibid.; Martin, 2010, supra n. 53, at 14.
58 In 2009, ‘U.S. Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Kurt Campbell and Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Scot Marciel traveled to Burma to meet with Burma’s Prime Minister Thein Sein
. . . ’. Martin, 2010, supra n. 53, at 8. In 2011, Senator John McCain also visited Myanmar to ‘assess
the country’s political situation after the civilian government took charge’.Southeast Asia from the
Corner of 18th & K Streets, vol. II, no. 9 (Center for Strategic & International Studies, 8 Jun. 2011), 9.
59 See generally Bert Morsbach, ‘Counterproductive Sanctions on Burma Should Be Lifted’,MIZZIMA,
26 May 2011, <www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/5325-counterproductive-sanctions-on-burma
-should-be-lifted.html>; Daniel Schearf, ‘Burma Sanctions Debated after Change in Government’,
Voice of America, 18 Apr. 2011, <www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/-Burma-Sanctions
-Debated-after-Change-in-Government-120057694.html>.
60 Myanmar’s top ten trade partners are Thailand, China, India, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia,
Indonesia, EU27, and Vietnam. ‘Myanmar’s Trade with Main Partners (2010), DG-Trade of the
European Commission’, <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113423
.pdf>, 8 Jun. 2011.
61 Singapore allegedly permitted Myanmar ‘officials to hold assets in bank accounts in Singapore’. Emma
Chanlett-Avery, ‘Singapore: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report for Congress’ (25 Feb.
2011), 3.
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which are major oil companies that provide financial assistance to the military
junta.62
More importantly, ASEAN has concluded region-based FTAs with six
countries and none of them exclude Myanmar from the FTA or impose trade
sanctions.63 These countries even include close US allies, such as Australia, Japan,
and Korea. The fact that Myanmar invariably benefits from foreign trade and
investment under these FTAs further undermines the effectiveness of economic
sanctions. US sanctions also gave China additional leverage over Myanmar. In fact,
China has become Myanmar’s second largest trade partner and the third largest
investor, with a focus primarily on oil and gas, electric power, and mining
sectors.64 The increasing Chinese presence in Myanmar will not only deteriorate
American interests but also influence ASEAN’s decision process.This development
ironically contravenes the US strategic objective to counterbalance China’s rise in
Southeast Asia.65 These loopholes should prompt the US government and
Congress to articulate a more pragmatic policy on Myanmar, thereby removing
this geopolitical obstacle to a US-ASEAN FTA.
3 A CONSTRUCTIVE FTA ROADMAP IN THE CONTEXT OFASIAN
REGIONALISM
Faced with the proliferation of Asian FTAs and challenges by regional powers, it is
vital for the United States to implement a constructive FTA strategy to maintain
its leadership in the Asia Pacific. Washington must recognize ASEAN’s status as
indispensable regional architecture in practice rather than simply in political
62 See Pauline Chiou, ‘Analysis: Why Sanctions Aren’t Working in Myanmar’, <http://articles.cnn
.com/2009-07-02/world/myanmar.sanctions_1_myanmar-government-jade-and-rubies-natural-gas?_
s=PM:WORLD>, 5 Jul. 2009 (explaining that Chevron and TOTAL are able to operate in
Myanmar ‘because their contracts were signed with Myanmar’s military government before
international pressure was tightened’). US sanctions laws allow Chevron to ‘consider voluntary
divestment over time’. Larry A. Niksch & Martin A. Weiss, ‘Burma: Economic Sanctions, CRS
Report for Congress’ (3 Aug. 2009), 7.
63 For the list of ASEAN’s FTA partners, see ‘AFTA & FTAs’, <www.aseansec.org/4920.htm>, 2
Aug. 2011. Simon Crean, Australian Minister of Trade, stated that ‘Australia does not have trade
sanctions against Myanmar, as we see our financial sanctions and travel restrictions targeted at the
Burmese regime . . . as a more effective response to the situation in Myanmar’. ‘Global Crisis
versus Free Trade, AANZFTA: Building a Deeper Integration with ASEAN’, ASEAN Affairs,
<www.aseanaffairs
.com/interview/aanzfta_global_crisis_versus_free_trade>, 2 Aug. 2011.
64 ‘Myanmar’s Trade with Main Partners (2010)’, supra n. 60; Niksch, supra n. 55, at 10. It is estimated
that 60% of Myanmar’s economy is controlled by China.Ibid.
65 Leon T. Hadar, ‘U.S. Sanctions against Burma: A Failure on All Fronts’, Trade Policy Analysis, no. 1,
26 Mar. 1998, <www.cato.org/pubs/trade/tpa-001.html> (‘Without engagement with
ASEAN . . . there was a danger that [Mynmar] would form closer ties with China, a development
that would pose a direct strategic threat toVietnam and an indirect one to the United States.’).
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discourse.66 A framework that reinvigorates US-ASEAN FTA negotiations should
be a priority of the US trade agenda. From economic and political perspectives,
the Obama Administration’s TPP initiative may be a building block for a
US-ASEAN FTA, but it cannot be a substitute for the latter. The United States
should consider the ‘ASEAN way’ of FTAs based on a framework agreement
approach. This ‘Plan B’ roadmap will serve as a building block to deepen trade
liberalization and circumvent political opposition that the TPP negotiations
currently encounter.
3.1 EMERGING CENTRALITY OF ASEAN
In the early 1990s, Washington’s lukewarm approach to ASEAN did not
significantly affect US political and trade interests in the region because ASEAN
was not seen as Asia’s focus. Since its inception in 1967,ASEAN remained a loose
organization due to its ‘non-interference’ principle.67 ASEAN’s economic
integration did not begin until 1992 when countries decided to form the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA) through the Common Effective Preferential Tariff
(CEPT) scheme.68 The progress was limited for two reasons. First, to
accommodate ASEAN states’ divergent economic interests, the AFTA allowed
substantial exclusions on trade in goods and had little impact on NTBs and service
trade.69 Second, most ASEAN countries pursued significant unilateral reduction in
tariffs, and the extra margin of benefits conferred by the AFTA was rather
restricted.70 Based on intra-ASEAN traders’ observation, the system was of little
use because the AFTA’s lower tariff levels that they used covered a mere 5% of
overall trade.71 These factors made the scheme ‘a paper exercise’ of trade
liberalization within ASEAN.72
ASEAN’s importance changed dramatically in the twenty-first century. The
bloc’s geopolitical location and economic integration accelerated its emerging
66 See, e.g., ‘Joint Statement of the 1st ASEAN-U.S. Leaders’ Meeting, Singapore, 15 Nov. 2009’,
<http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp?View,14148> (‘We agreed to work closely together in
building this regional architecture . . . [and] reaffirmed the importance of ASEAN centrality in
this process.’).
67 Severino, supra n. 51, at 87-88; see also ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), preamble
(ASEAN Member States should ‘ensure their stability and security from external interference in any
form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities ….’).
68 Frank Frost, ASEAN’s Regional Cooperation and Multilateral Relations: Recent Developments and
Australia’s Interests, Parliament of Australia Department of Parliamentary Services Research Paper, No.




72 Razeen Sally, ‘The ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Economic Community: A Watershed for
Regional Economic Integration’, in ASEAN: Life after the Charter, ed. S.Tiwari (2010), 113, 114.
A PROSPECTIVE US-ASEAN FTA 379
centrality in Asian regionalism. Because of competition from the EU and North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), ASEAN leaders were concerned that
procrastinating intra-ASEAN integration would jeopardize ASEAN’s
competitiveness. Hence, during the 2003 ASEAN summit, ASEAN states adopted
the Bali Concord II to usher ASEAN’s development.73 The leaders expected to
establish an ASEAN Community based on three pillars, including political and
security cooperation, sociocultural cooperation, and economic cooperation.74 The
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint, adopted in 2007, also provides
an outline and schedule for the formation of the AEC by 2015.75
As of January 2010, ASEAN-6 (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) eliminated tariffs covering 99.65% of the
CEPT’s tariff lines.76 Less developed CLMV countries also accomplished 0%–5%
tariff rates under 98.96% of such tariff lines.77 Moreover, expanded services
commitments negotiated under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services
resulted in the service sector receiving 50.6% of ASEAN’s FDIs in 2009.78 The
new trade facilitation efforts also progressively diminish NTBs in areas covering
customs and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures.79 Due to these
developments, ASEAN has achieved 73.6% of the AEC’s target and reached the
significant growth rate of 7.6% in 2010, after a weak 1.5% during the 2009
financial crisis.80
ASEAN’s external FTAs also complement intra-ASEAN integration. Since
ASEAN first signed the framework agreement with China in 2002, ASEAN has
concluded trade pacts with Japan, Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand.81
January 2010 witnessed the completion of free trade areas with China and Korea,
as well as the commencement of the implementation of the
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA) and the ASEAN-India Trade
in Goods Agreement.82 These FTAs are significant because they cemented
ASEAN’s status in Asian regionalism. The hub-and-spoke system centred in
73 Press Statement by the Chairperson of the 9th ASEAN Summit and the 7th ASEAN+3 Summit (Bali,
Indonesia, 7 Oct. 2003).
74 Article 1 of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II).
75 ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard (2010), 3.
76 ASEANAnnual Report: 2009–2010, at 27.
77 Ibid.
78 ‘Keynote Address by H.E.S. Pushpanathan, Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN for ASEAN
Economic Community, at the ASEAN Roundtable 2010X’, <www.asean.org/24656.htm>, 9 Oct.
2008.
79 Ibid.
80 ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard (2010), 13; ‘Table 2: Selected Key ASEAN Macroeconomic
Indicators, 15 Feb. 2011’, <www.aseansec.org/stat/Table2.pdf>; Esther Samboh, ‘ASEAN Forecasts
Lower GDP Growth’, Jakarta Post, 11 Apr. 2011, <www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/04/11
/asean-forecasts-lower-gdp-growth.html-0>.
81 For information on ASEAN’s FTAs, see <www.aseansec.org/4920.htm>, 20 Oct. 2010.
82 ASEANAnnual Report: 2009–2010, at 25.
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ASEAN is acceptable to regional powers, such as the United States and Japan.
Regionalism based on ASEAN carefully avoids a Sino-centric trade block,
particularly given that China has signed FTAs with Hong Kong, Macau, ASEAN,
Singapore, Pakistan, New Zealand, and Taiwan.83 ASEAN-based FTAs also bring
business and geopolitical advantages for ASEAN under its post-Cold War strategy
of power balance.84 The signal toWashington is straightforward.A trade policy on
Asia cannot ignore ASEAN.
Increased trade under external FTAs also enhances ASEAN economic
integration. As these FTAs do not exclude any ASEAN countries, Member States
benefit from foreign trade and investment according to their comparative
advantage. This will give extra incentive for ASEAN countries to further reduce
intra-ASEAN trade barriers to lower production costs and attract FDIs. In
addition, FTA negotiation and implementation strengthen ASEAN’s capacity
building to concentrate on unified interests in external economic relations as a
single entity. Absent a written procedure, ASEAN’s chief FTA negotiators,
the Leaders of the Senior Economic Officials’ Meeting, with the assistance of the
ASEAN Economic Ministers, have developed an informal process to coordinate
members’ positions in negotiations.85 In 2007, ASEAN countries signed the
ASEAN Charter that confers a legal personality on the bloc.86 It is expected that
the Charter will strengthen ASEAN’s FTA negotiation mechanism, as Article
41.7of the Charter mandates that the ASEAN Coordinating Council prescribe
procedures for international agreement negotiations.87 Consequently, ASEAN’s
existing FTAs and escalated trade negotiations capacity will give the group
additional leverage over a prospective US-ASEAN FTA. For these reasons, I
83 For information on China’s FTAs, see <http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/ensingapore.shtml>, 20
Oct. 2010; for an analysis on China’s FTA considerations, see Pasha L. Hsieh, ‘The China-Taiwan
ECFA, Geopolitical Dimensions andWTO Law’, J. Int’l Eco. L. 14, no. 1 (2011): 121, 131–133.
84 For details on ASEAN’s ‘power balance’ policy, see generally Sandy Gordon, ‘South Asia after the
ColdWar:Winners and Losers’, Asian Survey 35, no. 10 (1995): 879, 879–895.
85 David Chin Soon Siong, ‘ASEAN’s Journey towards Free Trade’, in Economy Diplomacy: Essays and
Reflections by Singapore’s Negotiators, ed. C.L. Lim & Margaret Liang (2010), 209, 241. For ASEAN’s
organization chart, see Lee Hsien Loong, ‘The Future Market of ASEAN’, in Think ASEAN!
Rethinking Marketing toward ASEAN Community (2015), ed. Philip Kotler et al. (2007), 42, 44, and 48.
86 See Art. 3 of the Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (‘ASEAN . . . is hereby
conferred legal personality.’); see also Jeffrey Chan Wah Teck, ‘ASEAN Legal Personality under Its
New Charter – Its Nature, Meaning and Implications: Status of the Work and Issues Involved’, in
ASEAN: Life after the Charter, ed. S.Tiwari (2010), 1, 8 (‘Although ASEAN may not be a legal person
prior to the Charter, its Secretariat . . . has operated in many jurisdictions, notably in Indonesia
where it has its headquarters, as a legal person.’).
87 See Art. 41.7 of the Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (‘The procedures for
concluding such agreements shall be prescribed by the ASEAN Coordinating Council in
consultation with the ASEAN Community Councils.’). The ASEAN Coordinating Council
comprises of foreign ministers of ASEAN states.
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suggest that Washington acknowledge ASEAN’s emerging centrality in Asia by
pursuing a constructive roadmap for a bilateral FTA.
3.2 CHALLENGES TO THETPP AGREEMENT
Regardless of Washington’s political rhetoric reiterating its focus on ASEAN, the
new trade priority of the United States ignores ASEAN as a group.The USTR’s
current trade effort concentrates on negotiating an expandedTPP, which builds on
an FTA that took effect between the Pacific-4 (P4) countries including Singapore,
New Zealand, Chile, and Brunei in 2006.88 In November 2009, the Obama
Administration notified Congress of the government’s intention to participate in
negotiations with TPP countries.89 These trade partners perceive the TPP as a
‘high quality, twenty-first century agreement’ that will provide a roadmap towards
the FTAAP covering twenty-one APEC economies.90 As of August 2011,
negotiating parties include nine countries – the United States, the original P-4
countries, Australia, Peru,Vietnam, and Malaysia.91 There have been seven rounds
of negotiations, including the most recent one in Vietnam in June 2011.92
Although the deadline for concluding the TPP remains uncertain, TPP partners
aim to provide a framework by the US-hosted APEC Leaders’ Meeting in
Honolulu in November 2011.93
For the United States, motives for promoting the TPP are twofold.The TPP
provides a substitute pathway towards Asian regionalism other than the
Beijing-preferred EAEC based on the ‘ASEAN Plus Three’ framework, which will
likely exclude the United States.94 The TPP therefore not only avoids America’s
marginalization from Asian FTA networks but also reinforces its leadership in
the process. Moreover, the comprehensive contents of the TPP can be set as the
benchmark for prospective partners. The United States essentially transplants the
American approach to FTA negotiations into the TPP process, thereby elevating
theTPP standards to maximize US trade interests.
88 Fergusson &Vaughn, supra n. 23, at 1.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., 8; ‘Sixth Round of Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) Negotiations’, <www.dfat.gov.au/
fta/tpp/110404-tpp-stakeholder-update-6.html>, 10 Aug. 2011.
91 See Fergusson &Vaughn, supra n. 23, at 1 (‘Malaysia was accepted as the ninth negotiation partner in
October 2010, and the nine conducted a fourth round of negotiations in December 2010 in New
Zealand.’).
92 ‘Steady Progress at the Seventh Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Round’, <www.ustr.gov/about-us
/press-office/press-releases/2011/june/steady-progress-seventh-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp>, 11 Aug.
2011.
93 ‘Trade Ministers Meet to Discuss TPP Progress’, <www.trademinister.gov.au/releases/2011
/ce_mr_110519.html>, 19 May 2011.
94 The ‘ASEAN Plus Three’ framework includes ten ASEAN countries plus China, Korea, and Japan.
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I do not challenge the TPP initiative as a positive development for trade
liberalization in the Asia Pacific. Nevertheless, the TPP cannot replace a
US-ASEAN FTA. The current TPP members include only four ASEAN states
(Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam). Three ASEAN countries (Cambodia,
Laos, and Myanmar) are not APEC members and will unlikely be considered as
potential TPP partners.95 In various aspects, the TPP resembles the previously
failed USTIFA approach, which is counterproductive to ASEAN’s integration and
US regional influence. The United States should prioritize a US-ASEAN FTA
over the TPP and utilize the former as a foundation for the latter as the long-term
goal.Washington’s sole pursuit of the TPP not only misses the geopolitical focus
but also increases the complexity of the negotiation. There are some nearly
insurmountable challenges that the TPP negotiations will encounter and that will
likely frustrate Obama’s FTA roadmap.
First, the TPP’s major dilemma is the unpredictability of new members.
Despite the agreement’s ‘open accession clause’ that permits entry into the
agreement ‘by any APEC Economy or other State’,96 its WTO-plus liberalization
levels hinder potential membership. For instance, Japan’s devastated farming
industry following the 2011 mega-tsunami, earthquake, and nuclear disaster has
remarkably weakened the government’s ability to ‘sacrifice’ the agricultural
protectionism in exchange for TPP membership.97 The liberalization of the dairy
market has also caused grave concerns to Canada and New Zealand. Notably, US
trade with current TPP countries simply represents 6% of its overall trade with the
world. Absent participation by major economies, the TPP is doomed as an
insignificant trade exercise. Furthermore, even assuming TPP partners intend to
use the agreement as the blueprint for the FTAAP, it is inconceivable that they are
prepared to negotiate with all twenty-one APEC economies. APEC members
range from Papua New Guinea, China to Russia, which has yet to join theWTO.
The massive variance in economic levels, compounded by the lack of common
commitments, will invariably complicate the TPP process. This membership
dilemma makes the TPP much less attractive than a US-ASEAN FTA, which
possesses clearly defined members with shared political interests.
Second, TPP negotiations face the problem of tackling overlapping FTAs
among partners, which agreed to have theTPP coexist with these existing FTAs.98
95 Figure A-1: TPP States and Potential Additional Members, Fergusson & Vaughn, supra n. 23, at 18;
Annex 1.
96 Article 20.6.1 of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (P4 Agreement).
97 See Aurelia George Mulgan, ‘TPP off Japan’s Trade Agenda for the Time Being’, East Asia Forum,
19 Apr. 2011,
<www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/04/19/tpp-off-japans-trade-agenda-for-the-time-being/> (explaining
Japan’s position on theTPP).
98 Russell L. Smith, ‘Whither (and Whether) a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?’, KWR International,
<www.kwrintl.com/library/2010/tpp.html>, 24 Aug. 2011.
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The multiple FTAs will worsen the ‘spaghetti bowl’ problem that often diminishes
trade liberalization due to different sets of rules of origin (ROO). For example, a
controversial ROO issue is whether the TPP should adopt the ‘yarn-forward’ rules
under which preferential treatment for textile and apparel products is only granted
if they originate from FTA partners and their cutting and assembling also occur in
the region.99 Such rules, which were already included in the NAFTA and
following US FTAs, are preferred by the US textile industry but will invariably
contraveneVietnam’s export interests.100
Third, the complicated web of FTAs poses additional challenges to goods
market access schedules, in which TPP countries differ fundamentally in
negotiating modality. As the schedules have different tariff reductions and
deadlines,Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore proposed plurilateral negotiations
over such schedules with the goal of making the talks more transparent and
straightforward.101 However, the United States prefers a two-stage strategy. It will
negotiate a common goods market schedule only after bilateral negotiations with
its non-FTA partners (Brunei, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Vietnam) are
completed.102 The US objective is to exert pressure over non-FTA partners to
substantially liberalize domestic markets before they join multilateral negotiations.
This strategy may maximize US trade interests in bilateral negotiations but risks
delaying the TPP process.Although a hybrid compromise was allegedly reached, it
remains doubtful whether this approach can yield substantial results.103 In
addition, the TPP market access schedule talks can be further handicapped because
TPP partners have yet to agree on whether schedules under existing FTAs should
be renegotiated.104 Even US agricultural groups, which often form strong
lobbying powers, are divided on this perspective, given that producers and
processors have opposite interests.105
99 Leonie Barrie, ‘Why US Textile Groups Fear Vietnam in TPP Pact’, <www.just-style
.com/analysis/why-us-textile-groups-fear-vietnam-in-tpp-pact_id111261.aspx>, 2 Jun. 2011.
100 Ibid.; Jonathan Fee & B.J. Shannon, ‘Overview of the Central America – Dominican Republic Free
Trade Agreement’, <www.cottonusasourcing.com/Business/contentEn.cfm?ItemNumber=1809>, 20
Aug. 2011.
101 Joe Nunweek, ‘TPP Second Talks: Past Agreements and Regulatory Coherence’, TPP Digest, 5 Jul.
2010, <http://tppdigest.org/index.php?option=com_tag&task=tag&tag=market-access>.
102 ‘Official: U.S. TPP Goods Market Access Offer Will Not Exclude Any Sector’, Inside U.S. Trade, 12
Jan. 2011.
103 See Claude Barfield, ‘The TPP: A Model for 21st Century Trade Agreements?’, East Asia Forum, 25
Jun. 2011, <www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/25/the-tpp-a-model-for-21st-century-trade-agreements/>
(‘In 2009, a hybrid approach was adopted under which countries will be allowed to make offers on a
bilateral basis or to theTPP membership as a whole.’).
104 Smith, supra n. 98; see ibid. (‘The US has strongly urged that existing FTA market access schedules be
maintained, as bilateral agreements provide both defensive and offensive benefits to US trade.’).
105 See Smith, supra n. 98 (‘[A]gricultural producers such as dairy, sugar and . . . meat and livestock want
existing FTAs to be kept in place and see limited benefit from the TPP negotiations. Food importers,
processors and exporters, on the other hand, favor revisiting the existing FTAs.’).
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Fourth, the TPP’s controversial IPR provisions constitute a significant
challenge to negotiation.The US position is to pursue standards beyond theWTO
Agreement Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) with
the goal of elevating IPR criteria to those under US law.106 US proposals include
non-TRIPS obligations in the TPP. For instance, to impede ‘the unauthorized
storage and transmission of copyrighted materials’, TPP countries should offer
deterrent ‘legal incentives for service providers to cooperate with copyright
owners’.107 Although comparable provisions exist in the US-Australia FTA and
the USSFTA, developing country partners will find these obligations hard to
accept.108 In addition, the United States seeks to qualify TPP members’ existing
rights under the TRIPS. A prime example is Article 27 of the TRIPS, which
authorizes WTO members to exclude two categories – ‘plants and animals’ and
‘diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of human or
animals’ – from patentability.109 However, the US draft provides that TPP
members ‘shall make patents available for inventions for’ such categories with
limited exceptions on ‘ordre public or morality’ grounds.110 These TRIP-plus
provisions will increase regulatory costs and make the compromise difficult,
particularly because, as of 2011, five TPP countries remain on the US Special 301
List.111
Lastly, other WTO-plus obligations that may similarly stall negotiations
include government procurement issues. Notably, Brunei, Chile, and New Zealand
have not even acceded to theWTO GPA.112 TPP partners may find US insistence
on the inclusion of environmental and labour rights clauses intrusive.113 Their
concern is realistic because in 2010,Washington filed the first labour complaint
under its FTAs, alleging that Guatemala’s ineffective enforcement of labour laws
violates Article 16 of the US-Dominican Republic-Central America FTA
(CAFTA-DR).114 TheseWTO-plus elements, aggravated by the bipartisan attitude
106 See Fergusson & Vaughn, supra n. 23, at 14 (explaining US negotiating objectives for FTAs’ IPR
protection).
107 ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership Intellectual Property Rights Charter Draft, 10 Feb. 2011’,
<http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf>,Art. 16.3(a).
108 Article 17.11.29(a) of the US-Australia FreeTrade Agreement;Art. 16.9.2(a) of the US-Singapore Free
Trade Agreement.
109 Articles 3(a) and (b) of the AgreementTrade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
110 ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership Intellectual Property Rights Charter Draft’, supra n. 107,Arts 8.2 and 8.3.
111 Chile is on the Priority List, and Brunei, Malaysia, Peru, andVietnam are on theWatch List. Executive
Summary, 2011 Special 301 Report, supra n. 18.
112 Parties and Observers to the GPA, supra n. 17.
113 See Fergusson &Vaughn, supra n. 23, at 15 (‘In August 2010, USTR officials announced that all TPP
participants, despite differences in levels of development, would be required to meet the same labor
and environmental conditions [as other US FTA partners].’).
114 ‘U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk Announces Next Step in Labor Rights Enforcement Case
against Guatemala’, <www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/august/us-trade
-representative-ron-kirk-announces-next-ste>,August 2011.
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towards the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) Program, worsened the
unpredictability of US Congressional approval of the TPP in the post-TPA era.115
The fate of long-awaited US FTAs with Columbia, Panama, and South Korea can
undermineTPP participants’ confidence in negotiating with the United States.116
3.3 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ANDWTO ISSUES
The above-analysed issues show that TPP negotiations are tackling an expanded
version of obstacles that a US-ASEAN FTA may encounter.The US approach is
not only overly ambitious as to the TPP’s geographic scope and liberalization
standards but also lacks the collective support from ASEAN. The Obama
Administration is choosing an FTA roadmap with a misplaced priority. The
leadership that Washington seeks to demonstrate in fact hinders the impetus to
finalize theTPP.
As the ‘American way’ of getting involved in Asian regionalism either by the
bilateral TIFA approach or the TPP initiative proves infeasible, it is advisable to
consider a constructive ‘Plan B’ roadmap based on the ‘ASEAN way’ of trade
integration. Specifically, the interim objective should be a US-ASEAN framework
agreement that provides a legal basis for FTA negotiations. In the long run, this
FTA will solidify ASEAN’s position with America in the TPP process. Lessons
learned from experiences dealing with problems that result from development gaps
such as IPR enforcement and government procurement can be applied to
developing countries in TPP negotiations. Moreover, the TPP that builds on a
US-ASEAN FTA can facilitate the aspiration of achieving the FTAAP. Both the
United States and ASEAN will, consequently, benefit from becoming key pillars in
the hub-and-spoke architecture.
3.3[a] A US-ASEAN Framework Agreement as an EnhancedTIFA
The ASEAN experience in negotiating external FTAs can serve as a model for a
US-ASEAN FTA. ASEAN’s approach originates from its internal integration
towards the AEC. Except for the AANZFTA, four of ASEAN’s five region-based
FTAs began with a framework agreement that provides a timetable for finalizing
enabling agreements. This approach not only applies to ASEAN’s FTAs but also
115 See ‘US FTAs Reach Congressional Committees, Only to Face Political Limbo over Worker Aid’,
Bridges Weekly Trade New Digest 15, no. 25 (6 Jul. 2011): 3 (‘[T]he prospect of reauthorizing an
extension of the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programme, which provides assistance to workers
displaced by foreign competition, has various Republicans balking, anxious about the increased
spending . . . .’).
116 For example, as of August 2011, the US Congress has not ratified the Korea-US FTA that was
signed in 2007. EU, South Korea Free Trade Pact Enters into Force, ibid., 7–8.
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provides a model for the politically volatile China-Taiwan Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement (ECFA).117 As of January 2010, the ASEAN-China FTA
(ACFTA) and the AESAN-Korea FTA (AKFTA) were completed under the
framework agreement approach.118 The ASEAN-China Framework Agreement,
concluded in 2002, was the first FTA experiment with ASEAN’s trade partners.119
This agreement was subsequently supplemented by four enabling agreements on
trade in goods (2004), dispute settlement (2004), trade in services (2007), and
investments (2009), respectively.120 The ACFTA forms the largest free trade area in
the world and met the goal of creating an FTA that its Framework Agreement
envisioned.121
The United States may consider a prospective US-ASEAN framework
agreement as an ‘enhancedTIFA’.122 This TIFA is distinguishable from the original
US-ASEAN TIFA in several ways.The TIFA has no legal status under WTO law.
Yet, a framework agreement in the ASEAN context constitutes an ‘interim
agreement necessary for’ or ‘leading to’ an FTA under Article XXIV of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).123 In terms of the procedural
notification process, the 2006 WTO General Council Decision on the
Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements makes no distinction
between an interim agreement and a full-fledged regional trade agreement
(RTA).124 Under theTransparency Mechanism, the United States and ASEAN will
be required to notify the Council for Trade in Goods and the Council for Trade in
117 Siong, supra n. 85, at 229–243; Hsieh, supra n. 83, at 138–1341.
118 ASEANAnnual Report: 2009–2010, at 25.
119 Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and the People’s
Republic of China (China-ASEAN Framework Agreement) was concluded on 4 Nov. 2002.
120 The texts of China-ASEAN Framework Agreement and enabling agreements are available at China
FTA Network, <http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/chinaasean.shtml>, 20 Aug. 2011.
121 Article 2 of the China-ASEAN Framework Agreement.
122 See Richard P. Cronin, ‘A New U.S.-ASEAN Trade Tack’, <www.stimson.org/essays
/a-new-us-asean-trade-tack/>, 9 Feb 2006 (‘[A]n “Enhanced TIFA” could serve as an interim deal
that incrementally facilitates more trade and investment, but doesn’t try to resolve all the issues in one
fell swoop.’).
123 See Art. XXIV.5 of the General Agreement onTariffs andTrade (GATT) (‘ . . . an interim agreement
necessary for the formation of . . . free trade area . . . .’); Art. XXIV.7(a) GATT (‘ . . . an interim
agreement leading to the formation of such a[n] . . . area . . . .’); Understanding on the
Interpretation of Art. XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Art. XXIV
Understanding), paras 1 and 12 (‘ . . . interim agreement leading to the formation of a . . . free
trade area’).
124 For instance, the EC-Chile Interim Agreement was notified to the WTO as a full agreement despite
its ‘interim’ nature indicated by a ten-year transitional period. Committee on Regional Trade
Agreements (CRTA), Examination of the Interim Agreement between the EC and Chile – Note on
the Meeting of 28 Jul. 2005,WT/REG/164/M/1, 6 Oct. 2005, para. 10. See also Lorand Bartels,
‘“Interim Agreements” under Article XXIV GATT’, World Trade Rev. 8, no. 2: 339, 342 (‘[T]he
Decision makes no distinction between interim and “full” regional trade agreement with an
implementation period.’).
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Services prior to the application of a bilateral framework agreement.125 Moreover,
pursuant to Article XXIV.5(c) of the GATT, an interim agreement should contain
‘a plan and schedule for the formation of . . . a free trade area within a reasonable
length of time’.126
The ‘plan and schedule’ requirement includes the information on ‘when the
agreement is to be implemented by stages’.127 ASEAN’s framework agreements
meet this requirement. While ASEAN’s framework agreements with Japan and
Korea provide a plan and schedule for completing overall FTA negotiations,
comparable agreements with China and India go further by mandating respective
deadlines for trade in goods, services, and investments liberalization.128 Regarding
the ‘reasonable length of time’ requirement, the Understanding on the
Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT also requires the formation of an
FTA not to ‘exceed ten years only in exceptional cases’.129 The fact that the
ACFTA and the AKFTA commenced negotiations under framework agreements
in 2002 and 2005, respectively, and were both finalized in 2010 shows their
compliance with the requirement.130 In essence, a key difference between a
previous TIFA and an enhanced TIFA based on a framework agreement is that the
former simply provides a consultative mechanism, but the latter legally obliges
parties to engage in subsequent negotiations within a time frame. A US-ASEAN
framework agreement will, therefore, send a strong message to ASEAN leaders,
reinforcing a US FTA ‘promise’ that can effectively offset their concern about the
US president’s lack of fast-track authority.
125 Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Notification Format for Regional Trade Agreements,
WT/REG/16 (23 Nov. 2006).
126 Emphasis added.Art. XXIV.5(c) GATT.
127 Annex, Transparency Decision, para. 2(a)(ii); see also Transparency Decision, para. 1(b) (‘Members
parties . . . shall convey to the WTO . . . information on the RTA, including . . . any foreseen
timetable for its . . . provisional application . . . .’);Transparency Decision, para. 7 (‘To assist Members
in their consideration of a notified FTA: (a) the parties shall make available to the WTO Secretariat
data as specified in the Annex . . . and (b) the WTO Secretariat . . . shall prepare a factual
presentation of the RTA.’).
128 Preamble and Art. 10 of the Framework for Comprehensive Economic Partnership between the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Japan (ASEAN-Japan Framework Agreement), 8 Oct.
2003;Art. 5.2.3 of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation among the
Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the
Republic of Korea (ASEAN-Korea Framework Agreement), 13 Dec. 2005; Art. 3 of the
China-ASEAN Framework Agreement; Art. 8 of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive
Economic Cooperation between the Republic of India and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN-India Framework Agreement), 8 Oct. 2003.
129 Understanding on the Interpretation of Art. XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994 (Understanding), para. 3. The term ‘exceptional cases’ has yet to be defined in WTO
jurisprudence.
130 The China-ASEAN Framework Agreement and the ASEAN-Korea Framework Agreement were
concluded on 4 Nov. 2002 and 13 Nov. 2005, respectively.
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Furthermore, a framework agreement that liberalizes top priority sectors
represents a middle ground between a TIFA and an FTA. It paves the way for a
WTO-plus FTA without incurring imminent political opposition from industries
or Congress due to controversial issues including market access, IPR, labour rights,
or environmental standards.131 An ultimate FTA based on a framework agreement
is also required to comply withWTO rules. A US-ASEAN FTA should meet the
‘substantially all the trade’ requirement under Article XXIV.8(b) of the GATT and
the ‘substantially sectoral coverage’ requirement under ArticleV.1(a) of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).132 In fact, ASEAN’s framework
agreements stipulate these requirements as guiding principles for subsequently
negotiated Trade in Goods Agreements and Trade in Services Agreements.133 For
instance, both the ACFTA and the AKFTA satisfy the requirements by eliminating
tariffs for more than 90% of traded goods and liberalizing substantial services
sectors without ‘provid[ing] for the a priori exclusion of any mode of supply’.134
Hence,ASEAN’s FTA experiences andWTO rules reinforce the gradual approach
towards an FTA and should guide US-ASEAN trade negotiations.
3.3[b] Building Block Features under the Existing Legal Structure
As examined above, an enhanced TIFA based on ASEAN’s framework agreement
model is both WTO-consistent and constructive in current trade politics. A
US-ASEAN framework agreement should, therefore, learn from the building
block features of ASEAN’s previous framework agreements. First and foremost, a
US-ASEAN framework agreement should provide a time frame for enabling
agreements. ASEAN’s FTAs with China, Korea, and India are based on the legal
structure that includes a framework agreement and four subsequent agreements on
131 See Cronin, supra n. 122 (‘… U.S.-Asean trade negotiators could bypass knotty market access disputes
and hot button obstacles such as labor rights and working conditions that are required by Congress as
a condition for signing an FTA.’).
132 Article XXIV.8(b) GATT and Art. V.1(a) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
133 Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the ASEAN-China Framework Agreement; Art. 6 of the ASEAN-Japan
Framework Agreement; Arts 2.1 and 2.2 of the ASEAN-Korea Framework Agreement; Arts 3 and
4 of the ASEAN-India Framework Agreement.
134 For trade in goods and services liberalization under the ASEAN-China FTA and the
ASEAN-Korea FTA, see <www.fta.gov.sg/fta_akfta.asp?hl=3>, 20 Aug. 2011. The quantitative
benchmark for the ‘substantially all the trade’ rule usually ‘mean[s] liberalization of 90% of the
trade in goods between the FTA parties’. European Commission-Trade, CARIFORUM-EC EPA:
Trade in Goods (October 2008), 2. See footnote to Art. V.1(a) GATS (‘The “substantial sectoral
coverage” rule is to be “understood in terms of number of sectors, volume of trade affected and modes
of supply”.’); for details on this rule, seeWon-Mog Choi,‘Regional Economic Integration in East Asia:
Prospect and Jurisprudence’, J. Int’l Eco. L. 6, no. 1 (2003): 49, 64–65.
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goods, services, dispute settlement, and investment.135 Another feasible model is
the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) Agreement
negotiated under the timetable of the ASEAN-Japan Framework Agreement.
Absent separate enabling agreements, chapters on similar contents are included in
the single undertaking AJCEP Agreement.
Second, the ASEAN approach’s flexibility is shown in different liberalization
agendas based on categories of goods and economic development of ASEAN
states. For example, ASEAN’s framework agreements contain an ‘early harvest
program (EHP)’, which immediately accords preferential treatment to FTA
partners and serves as a preliminary step for an FTA.136 The EHP scope of
liberalization is adaptable. Although the EHPs under ASEAN’s framework
agreements are confined to goods, the EHP of the China-Taiwan ECFA, a
similarly interim agreement, includes services liberalization.137 Parties may,
therefore, choose to cover EHP sectors that are both non-sensitive and mutually
beneficial. Goods other than those covered in the EHP are placed on the ‘normal
track’ and the ‘sensitive track’ subject to different timetables and levels of tariff
reduction.138 The fact that the sensitive track allows highly sensitive agricultural
goods such as rice to be minimally affected or even excluded avoids initial impasse
similar to what TPP negotiations encounter.139 Less developed CLMV countries
are also given a longer period of time and supplementary stages for
liberalization.140 This aspect makes an ASEAN FTA significantly distinguishable
from the TPP because the latter imposes the same standards regardless of
participants’ levels of development.
Third, an agreement on dispute settlement that covers jurisdiction over
state-to-state conflicts arising from a framework agreement and enabling
agreements on goods, services, and investment is to be concluded between
parties.141 The mechanism that governs investor-to-state disputes is included in an
agreement on investment, which is usually negotiated at a later stage, thus allowing
135 For instance, Art. 1.4 of the ASEAN-Korea Framework Agreement identifies the agreements that
will ‘form part of legal instruments establishing the ASEAN-Korea FTA upon their respective
entry into force’.
136 For example, Art. 6 of the ASEAN-China Framework Agreement; Art. 7 of the ASEAN-India
Framework Agreement.
137 See Hsieh, supra n. 83 (‘As the EHP [of the ECFA]’ covers trade in goods and services, it is the
world’s first EHP that includes trade in services.).
138 For example, Art. 3 of the ASEAN-China Framework Agreement; Art. 3 of the ASEAN-India
Framework Agreement.
139 For an analysis on modalities for the sensitive track, see Siong, supra n. 85, at 221–240.
140 For example, Art. 3.4 of the ASEAN-China Framework Agreement; Art. 3.5 of the ASEAN-India
Framework Agreement. In other words, ASEAN six countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, Thailand, and Philippines) are usually subject to the ‘first round’ of liberalization under
ASEAN FTAs.
141 For discussion on three models of ASEAN FTA’s dispute settlement mechanisms, see Hsieh, supra
n. 83, at 152–53.
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parties to accumulate consensus on the more controversial investor-to-state
arbitration system. Finally, none of ASEAN’s FTAs with six countries exclude
Myanmar. US economic sanctions against Myanmar have posed a political obstacle
to realization of the FTA goal under the 2006 US-ASEAN FTA. Previous
discussions indicate that Washington has failed to achieve its FTA objective and
will risk alienating itself from ASEAN and advancing Chinese influence.The new
wave of Asian regionalism should compel the US government and Congress to
assess why the American approach is not even followed by close US allies.142 After
the nominally civilian government took office in 2010, the EU also adopted a soft
approach to temporarily suspend sanctions.143 A US-ASEAN framework
agreement needs to confront the Myanmar dilemma constructively. Given
overriding trade and geopolitical interests,Washington is advised to limit sanctions
on Myanmar to an extent that does not pose a hurdle to a region-based
US-ASEAN FTA.The interim goal can be the ‘ASEAN minus X’ formula under
which an ASEAN agreement takes effect absent ratification by all Member
States.144 This formula, which has been utilized in the Southeast Asian Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze
Pollution, can be extended to the trade arena.145 The United States may propose
an FTA with ASEAN without Myanmar, thus shifting the negotiation burden to
ASEAN as a whole. The prospect for a US-ASEAN FTA will be a robust
inducement for ASEAN countries to exert collective pressure on Myanmar.146 As
five ASEAN countries are Myanmar’s largest trading partners, their stronger stance
on the regime should play a more active role in changing it than US economic
sanctions.147
A US-ASEAN framework agreement modelled after the building block
features above will provide a cornerstone for a prospective US-ASEAN FTA.
142 Australia, Japan, and Korea concluded FTAs with ASEAN without excluding Myanmar. See also
‘Global Crisis versus Free Trade,AANZFTA: Building a Deeper Integration with ASEAN’, supra n. 63
(‘Australia does not have trade sanctions against Myanmar, as we see our financial sanctions and travel
restrictions targeted at the Burmese regime and its supporters as a more effective response to the
situation in Myanmar.’).
143 Schearf, supra n. 59 (‘The EU has issued a one-year suspension of its visa and asset freeze for civilian
leaders and the foreign minister.’).
144 KnowYour ASEAN, 2nd edn (2010), 45.The ‘ASEAN minus X’ or ‘Ten-X’ approach, which constitutes
an exception to the ASEAN consensus-based principle, has also been applied in liberalization in
intra-ASEAN service trade. Vo Tri Thanh, ‘ASEAN Economic Community: Perspective from
ASEAN’s Transitional Economies’, in Roadmap to an ASEAN Economic Community, ed. Denis Hew
(2005), 105, 108.
145 The two instruments only require seven and six ratifications, respectively, to become effective.Ibid.
146 For example, after Cyclone Nargis devastated Myanmar in 2008, ASEAN foreign ministers were able
to persuade the regime ‘to accept humanitarian assistance [and] to empower ASEAN to take the lead’.
Koh, supra n. 7, at 43–44.
147 The five countries are Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. ‘Myanmar’s Trade with
Main Partners (2010)’, supra n. 60.
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Notably, a region-based FTA can be complemented rather than hindered by
bilateral FTAs with individual ASEAN states. For instance, the fact that the
USSFTA covers two Indonesian islands – Batam and Bintan Special Economic
Zones – helps Indonesia gain additional foreign investments.148 The USSFTA’s
chapter on ROO also includes a novel design, known as the Integrated Sourcing
Initiative (ISI).149 The ISI allows certain medical equipment and information
technology products to count as Singapore goods under the FTA.150 The lack of
the requirement to prove the origin of an ISI product constitutes an inducement
for ASEAN companies to link to Singapore to receive the USSFTA’s preferential
treatment. These features of the USSFTA create spill-over economic benefits for
other ASEAN countries and should be incorporated into other bilateral FTAs.
Along with a region-based FTA, the United States may also expedite the
liberalization process through bilateral FTAs with ASEAN countries that involve
substantial trade interests.This approach has been taken by China and India, both
of which concluded FTAs with ASEAN as whole, but expanded services
liberalization under respective bilateral FTAs with Singapore and Malaysia.151 To
maximize liberalization under a US-ASEAN FTA and FTAs with separate ASEAN
states, the United States is also advised to assist ASEAN in capacity building. For
instance, the ASEAN Single Window Program that the US Agency for
International Development (USAID) supported since 2008 should be expanded
under a US-ASEAN framework agreement.152 This one-stop shop mechanism
allows ASEAN countries to exchange electronic import and export data so that
importers can ship goods to any Member States after finalizing customs procedures
at one regional port, thereby cutting time for customs clearance.153 Comparable
148 See Razeen Sally, Southeast Asia in theWTO (2004), 58–59 (‘The [USSFTA] has innovative provisions
for goods manufactured in Batam and Bintan, and trans-shipped through Singapore, to have duty-free
access to the U.S. market.’).
149 The list of products that are covered under the Integrated Sourcing Initiative is included in Annex 3B
of the US-Singapore FTA.
150 Ithnain Rossman, ‘The Goods Package’, in The United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement: Highlights
and Insights, edsTommy Koh & Chang Li Lin (2004), 61, 69.
151 The China-Singapore FTA’s 2011 Amendment Protocol allows ‘ASEAN-China FTA Package 2
Services Commitments to be extended to Singapore ahead of ASEAN’. ‘China-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement: Amendment Protocol’, <www.fta.gov.sg/press_release/CSFTA_Amendment_
Protocol_Factsheet007.pdf>, 22 Aug. 2011. In addition, the 2010 India-Malaysia Comprehensive
Economic Cooperation Agreement includes liberalization in services, which the ASEAN-India FTA
does not cover. ‘International Trade:Trade Agreements’, <http://commerce.nic.in/trade/international
_ta_current_details.asp>, 22 Aug. 2011.
152 See ‘ASEAN Single Window Program’, <www.usaid.gov/rdma/documents/ASEAN_Single
_Window_Briefer_200805_508.pdf>, 22 Aug. 2011 (explaining the key work areas of the five-year
programme). ASEAN’s Agreement to Establish and Implement the ASEAN Signal Window was
concluded in 2005 and its objectives are stated in Art. 3.
153 Under the ASEAN SingleWindow Project, ‘[t]he average time for customs clearance is expected to be
shortened to 30 minutes by 2012’. ‘Towards ASEAN One-stop Customs Market’, Vietnam Business
News, 8 May 2010, <http://vietnambusiness.asia/towards-asean-one-stop-customs-market/>.
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areas of economic cooperation can be extended to ‘behind the border’ issues such
as IPR capabilities and competition policy covered under the ASEAN-Japan
Framework Agreement.154 In sum, these policy recommendations will allow a
prospective US-ASEAN FTA to harmonize ASEAN states’ ROO, thus obviating
the ‘spaghetti bowl’ problem. The common yet differential liberalization scheme
will also help strengthen ASEAN integration and in turn benefit US exporters and
investors.
4 CONCLUSION
In the past decade,ASEAN has evolved as a regional hub in Asian regionalism due
to the bloc’s FTAs with major economies in the Asia Pacific. The United States
remains the only Pacific power that has not initiated any form of formal FTA with
ASEAN.This article argued that the legal framework governing US-ASEAN trade
ties should be reinvigorated, and it examined a feasible roadmap to conclude a
US-ASEAN FTA from legal and geopolitical perspectives. As this FTA involves
substantive interests that will arise from trade liberalization and security alliance, it
should be Washington’s priority on the trade agenda. Nevertheless, the US TIFA
approach and the Myanmar issue have obstructed such efforts.
The Doha Round impasse has prompted WTO members to pursue bilateral
and multilateral FTAs. These FTAs in turn became nations’ primary geostrategic
goal in the twenty-first century.Against this background, a new US FTA roadmap
is essential for acknowledging ASEAN’s emerging centrality in regional
architecture.The Obama Administration’s TPP initiative is a positive development,
but the TPP can, by no means, be a substitute for a US-ASEAN FTA.
Consequently, this article proposed an alternative roadmap based on an enhanced
TIFA that incorporates building block features of ASEAN’s framework
agreements with trading partners. The roadmap will lay a solid yet gradual
foundation for a region-based FTA. Although the impact of a prospective
US-ASEAN FTA remains to be seen, this FTA will assuredly fortify the
hub-and-spoke alliance across the Pacific and provide an important gateway to
Asian regionalism under the multilateral trading system.
154 Article 5 of the ASEAN-Japan Framework Agreement.
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FTA with the United States, Signed in
ASEAN N N 2006 N
Brunei
Darussalam
Y Y 2002 TPP, 2005
Cambodia Y N 2006 N
Indonesia Y Y 1996 N
Lao PDR Observer N N N
Malaysia Y Y 2004 Started FTA negotiations in 2006
(suspended in 2009), TPP (negotiating)
Myanmar Y N N N
Philippines Y Y 1989 N
Singapore Y Y N USSFTA, 2003; TPP, 2005
Thailand Y Y 2002 Started FTA negotiations in 2003
(suspended in 2006)
Vietnam Y Y 2007 TPP (negotiating)
•N:No;Y:Yes.
•TIFA:Trade and Investment Framework Agreement.
•TPP: Trans-Pacific Partnership; original members include Brunei, Chile,
New Zealand, and Singapore; Australia, Malaysia, Peru, the United States,
andVietnam are currently negotiating to join the group.
Annex 2.WTO Disputes between the United States and ASEAN Countries (as of
1 July 2011)





United States Philippines Philippines – Taxes on Distilled
Spirits
403 2010 GATT
United States Philippines Philippines – Measures
Affecting Trade and Investment
in the Motor Vehicle Sector
195 2000 GATT, SCM,
TRIMs
United States Philippines Philippines – Measures





United States Philippines Philippines – Measures











United States Indonesia Indonesia – Certain Measures
Affecting the Automobile
Industry
59 1996 GATT, SCM,
TRIMs, TRIPS
Indonesia United States United States – Measures
Affecting the Production and
Sale of Clove Cigarettes
406 2010 GATT, SPS,
TBT
Vietnam United States United States – Anti-dumping
Measures on Certain Shrimp
from Vietnam




Thailand United States United States – Anti-dumping
Measures on Polyethylene
Retail Carrier Bags from
Thailand
383 2008 AD, GATT
Thailand United States United States – Measures
Relating to Shrimp from
Thailand
343 2006 AD, GATT
Thailand United States United States – Provisional
Anti-dumping Measures on
Shrimp from Thailand
324 2004 AD, GATT
Philippines United States United States – Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products





United States United States – Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products
58 1996 GATT
•Information based on the WTO website and <http://www.worldtradelaw
.net/>.
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